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ABSTRACT
In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored
legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to "debias through law," by steering people in
more  rational  directions.  In  many  important  domains,  existing  legal  analyses  emphasize  the
alternative approach of insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, often
through blocking private choices. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal
strategies are efforts to engage in the very different approach of debiasing through law by reducing
or even eliminating people's boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts to
debias through law can avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that
take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects.
This paper offers a general account of how debiasing through law does or could work to address
legal questions across a range of areas, from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law.
Discussion is also devoted to the risks of government manipulation and overshooting that are













A growing body of legal analysis focuses on how human behavior 
deviates systematically from what would be predicted by the traditional 
economic assumption of unbounded rationality.
1 To the extent that legal rules 
are designed on the basis of their anticipated effects on behavior, bounded 
rationality is obviously relevant to the formulation of legal policy. But an 
important and under-addressed question is precisely how it is relevant to the 
formulation of legal policy. The most obvious possibility is that, given a 
demonstration of the existence and importance of a particular aspect of 
bounded rationality, the law should be structured to presume the persistence 
of that particular feature of human behavior.  
 
  Much existing work in behavioral law and economics is of this 
character. Consider, for instance, the large literature suggesting that 
boundedly rational consumers believe potentially risky products to be 
substantially safer than they in fact are. If such beliefs exist, then the law 
might – and to some degree does – respond by adopting heightened standards 
of manufacturer liability for consumer products (e.g., Latin 1994). Or 
consider the argument that “Monday morning quarter-backing” by judges or 
juries adversely affects judgments reached by these decision makers on 
matters of corporate law, so that corporations are held liable for bad events 
even if preventing those events would have been extremely difficult (e.g., 
Rachlinski 1998). If so, then the law could respond, as indeed it has with the 
“business judgment rule,” by largely vitiating the liability of corporate law 
actors, who would otherwise be vulnerable to such second-guessing on the 
part of adjudicators. More generally, rules and institutions might be, and 
frequently are, designed to curtail or even entirely block choice in the hope 
that legal outcomes will not fall prey to problems of bounded rationality. In 
the existing behavioral law and economics literature, bounded rationality 
“has been used to support the restriction of individual choice, almost without 
exception” (Rachlinski 2003, p. 1168). Boundedly rational behavior might 
be, and often is, taken to justify a strategy of insulation, attempting to protect 
legal outcomes from people’s bounded rationality.  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998a), Korobkin and Ulen 
(2000), Parisi and Smith (2004), Sunstein (2000), and law review symposia 




A quite different possibility – one that has received much less 
attention in the existing literature – is that legal policy may respond best to 
problems of bounded rationality not by insulating legal outcomes from its 
effects, but instead by operating directly on the boundedly rational behavior 
and attempting to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it. We describe 
legal policy in this category as “debiasing through law.” Such strategies are 
analytically distinct in important ways from the approach of insulation and, 
we claim below, often represent a less intrusive, more direct, and more 
democratic response to the problem of bounded rationality.  
 
In fact there exists a substantial, empirically-oriented social science 
literature on prospects for debiasing of individuals after a demonstration of a 
given form of bounded rationality.
2 But empirical findings about these forms 
of debiasing have made only limited appearances in the legal literature,
3 and 
equally important, social scientists interested in such forms of debiasing have 
generally not investigated the possibility of achieving them through law. In 
many important settings, empirical evidence suggests the substantial potential 
of these sorts of debiasing strategies, and from a legal policy perspective it is 
obviously important to ask about the role that law can play in facilitating such 
debiasing. That is our major focus in this paper.  
 
When debiasing of individuals after a demonstration of a given form 
of bounded rationality has been discussed in the legal literature, the treatment 
has focused on existing or proposed steps taken in procedural rules governing 
adjudication by judges or juries. Such work complements a longstanding 
literature examining and responding in a range of ways to bounded rationality 
in the adjudicative process (see, e.g., Rachlinski 2000, pp. 753-56). A well-
known example of debiasing through procedural rules governing the 
adjudicative process stems from the work by Linda Babcock, George 
Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff and Colin Camerer (1995) on the tendency 
of litigants to evaluate likely outcomes at trial in light of their own 
perspectives and interests. Thus, for instance, these authors find that 
individuals assigned to the role of the plaintiff and presented with exactly the 
same information as is presented to individuals assigned to the role of the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Fischhoff (1982) and Weinstein and Klein (2002). Many 
other illustrations appear in the body of the paper.  
3 As noted in the text just below, where debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors through law has been examined in the existing literature, the focus has 
been on achieving debiasing through procedural rules governing adjudication 
by judges or juries. We discuss several examples below.  
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defendant offer far higher estimates of the likelihood of a plaintiff victory in a 
lawsuit. Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1997) find, however, that 
this bias may be eradicated by requiring litigants to consider the weaknesses 
in their case or reasons that the judge might rule against them. In these 
circumstances, individuals in the plaintiff’s and defendant’s roles have 
similar views on likely trial outcomes.
4 The present paper, by contrast, gives 
primary emphasis to a different and broader form of debiasing through law – 
a category we call “debiasing through substantive law.” 
 
The central idea of debiasing through substantive law is that in some 
cases it may be desirable to understand or to reform the substance of law – 
not merely the procedures by which the law is applied in an adjudicative 
setting – with an eye toward debiasing those who suffer from bounded 
rationality. Through a series of examples from areas of law outside of the 
rules of adjudicative procedure, we hope to demonstrate that the project of 
debiasing through substantive law holds previously unrecognized promise for 
both understanding and improving the legal system.  
 
Section 1 begins by offering background for our project. Section 2 
focuses on debiasing through substantive law. It illustrates the general scope 
and power of this form of debiasing by describing the role it does or could 
play in addressing central questions across a range of legal domains, from 
consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Our analysis of 
debiasing through substantive law contrasts with the more usual focus in the 
existing legal literature on insulating outcomes from the effects of people’s 
bounded rationality.   
   
Section 3 explores some of the important normative questions raised 
by debiasing through law (whether achieved through substantive law or 
through procedural rules governing the adjudicative process). Compared to 
the more common approach of insulating legal outcomes from the effects of 
bounded rationality, an important advantage of strategies for debiasing 
through law is that they aim to correct errors while still preserving as much 
opportunity as possible for people to make their own choices. Under 
Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff’s approach of debiasing through 
procedural rules in response to litigants’ biased beliefs about trial outcomes, 
for instance, no decision making power or information is removed from 
litigants’ hands; by contrast, an “insulating” approach to litigants’ bias 
                                                 
4 It is possible that bias by real litigants – outside of an experimental setting – 
is more resilient (Farnsworth 2003, pp. 582-85). 
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suggests keeping information out of their hands entirely (Issacharoff and 
Loewenstein 1995, pp. 772-78). An important corollary of choice-preserving 
strategies is that they help to address boundedly rational behavior while 
avoiding the imposition of significant costs on those who do not exhibit 
bounded rationality. 
 
At the same time, debiasing through law in either of its two varieties 
(substantive or procedural) raises distinctive normative concerns that require 
discussion. Such debiasing involves the government in a self-conscious 
process of changing the behavior of at least some people by altering their 
perceptions of the world around them. In some respects, such government 
action is entirely routine, as government frequently and uncontroversially 
regulates in response to individuals’ misinformation, thereby altering 
perceptions in at least some instances. In extreme cases, however, debiasing 
through law could come to resemble a system of government propaganda in 
violation of widely-shared normative commitments. As our examples below 
will illustrate, however, many actual and conceivable forms of debiasing 
through law do not exhibit this problem.  
 
 
1.    Bounded Rationality 
 
  If debiasing through law is a response to bounded rationality, then an 
obvious first step is to understand the basic idea of bounded rationality. As is 
now well known in the legal literature and beyond, researchers in psychology 
and behavioral economics have uncovered a wide range of departures from 
unboundedly rational behavior. (They have also discovered other departures 
from traditional economic assumptions – such as the assumption that people 
generally exhibit narrowly self-interested rather than fairness-oriented 
behavior – but we focus on departures from unbounded rationality because in 
many cases such departures are clear mistakes that warrant correction, 
whereas the case of fairness-oriented behavior hardly presents a strong case 
for correction.)   
 
Departures from unbounded rationality take one of two general forms. 
First, individuals may make judgment errors. Second, human behavior may 
deviate from the precepts of expected utility theory. We briefly describe these 
two basic categories; we hope that many readers will find them familiar, but 
the following description should provide a helpful background for the 





1.1  Judgment Errors  
 
  Many judgment errors stem from “heuristics” that often shape human 
decision making. Begin with a familiar example of a heuristic. Asked how 
many words in a 2,000-word section of a novel end in “ing,” people give 
much larger estimates than those asked how many words have “n” as the 
second-to-last letter in the same material, notwithstanding the obvious fact 
that more words must satisfy the latter criterion than the former (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1983, p. 295). According to the “availability heuristic” at work in 
cases of this sort, the probability of an event is estimated after an assessment 
of how easily examples of the event can be called to mind. The availability 
heuristic often produces sensible judgments and behavior for people who lack 
detailed statistical information, but it also can lead to significant and severe 
errors. Heuristics, then, can produce important biases. Thus “availability 
bias” might be said to arise when the availability heuristic leads people to 
make predictable errors in assessing probabilities. The prospect of errors in 
some cases does not suggest that the behavior in question is “irrational” in the 
sense of being arbitrary or lacking plausible justification. The point instead is 
that the behavior, even if sensible in many cases, leads to systematic error in 
some of them. Bounded rationality is hardly the same as “irrationality” (Jolls, 
Sunstein and Thaler 1998b, p. 1594).  
 
A related set of findings emphasizes not mental short-cuts, but more 
direct biases that lead to inaccurate judgments. An illustration is hindsight 
bias, in which decision makers attach excessively high probabilities to events 
that ended up occurring; we referred to this bias above in discussing 
corporate law’s business judgment rule.  
 
An important bias that has received significant attention in the legal 
literature on bounded rationality – and that we suggest in section 2 creates 
important opportunities for debiasing through substantive law – is optimism 
bias. Optimism bias refers to the tendency of people to believe that their own 
probability of facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is. Viscusi and 
Magat (1987, pp. 93-95), for instance, report that roughly half of consumers 
they surveyed considered their own household to be below average in risk, 
while the other half considered their household to be average in risk – yet 
obviously in aggregate these perceptions cannot be correct. As summarized in 
Jolls (1998, p. 1659), people typically think that their chances of a range of 
bad outcomes, from having an auto accident to contracting a particular 
disease to getting fired from a job, are significantly lower than the average 
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person’s chances of suffering these misfortunes – although, again, this cannot 
be true for everyone.  
 
While the “above average” effect just described is well established, it 
does not by itself establish that people optimistically underestimate their 
statistical risk (Viscusi and Magat 1987, pp. 95-96). For instance, people 
might believe that they are less likely than most people to contract cancer, 
while also having an accurate sense of the actual probability that they will 
contract cancer. But substantial evidence suggests that people sometimes 
exhibit optimism bias in the estimation of actual probabilities, not simply 
relative risk. For example, Armour and Taylor (2002, pp. 334-35) describe 
studies reporting that professional financial experts consistently overestimate 
likely corporate earnings, while business school students overestimate their 
likely starting salary and the number of offers that they will receive. People 
also underestimate their own likelihood of being involved in an automobile 
accident, and their frequent failure to buy insurance for floods and 
earthquakes is consistent with the view that people are excessively 
optimistic.
5 It is noteworthy that these data pointing to optimism bias come 
from individuals making judgments that they make regularly in their 
everyday lives, rather than judgments far removed from those they would 
ordinarily make.  
 
 
1.2  Departures from Expected Utility Theory 
 
Along with the category of judgment errors, the idea of bounded 
rationality includes ways in which actual choices depart from the predictions 
of expected utility theory – a foundational feature of traditional economic 
analysis. While departures from expected utility theory have received only 
modest attention in the existing social science literature on debiasing of 
boundedly rational actors (for reasons we shall explain), below we suggest 
their relevance to debiasing through law. 
 
A leading alternative to expected utility theory is Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. According to this theory, people 
evaluate outcomes based on the change they represent from an initial 
reference point, rather than based on the nature of the outcome itself. 
Prospect theory also posits that people weigh losses more heavily than gains, 
thus showing “loss aversion.”  
                                                 




Related to loss aversion is the “endowment effect,” according to 
which an individual’s valuation of an entitlement depends on whether the 
individual is given initial ownership of that entitlement (Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler 1990). Thus, for example, individuals endowed with university 
mugs demand substantially more to sell these mugs than unendowed 
individuals are willing to pay to buy them – although recent evidence points 
to the influence of context-specific features of the environment on the 
occurrence of the endowment effect (Plott and Zeiler 2005).  
 
  Also related to loss aversion are framing effects. Because losses 
matter more than gains, framing outcomes as losses rather than gains will 
generally affect how people respond.
6 As one example, consider the vigorous 
dispute over the content of a recent government advertising campaign in the 
United States (Peterson 2003). The advertising campaign in question 
involved the effects of breastfeeding of newborns. In the approach favored by 
breastfeeding advocates, the advertisements would refer to the risks to the 
child of leukemia and other diseases from not consuming breast milk – and 
this was the approach taken in the original version of the advertisements. 
Showing an intuitive understanding of prospect theory, those opposed to the 
original advertisements fought to have the government emphasize the 
advantages of breastfeeding rather than the affirmative harms (losses) of not 
breastfeeding. Below we discuss how the legal system might employ framing 
effects to engage in debiasing of boundedly rational actors. 
 
 
2.  Debiasing Through Substantive Law 
 
This section develops a set of organizing examples of debiasing 
through substantive law. (The introduction and the appendix refer to existing 
examples of debiasing through procedural rules governing the adjudicative 
process.) We suggest how the idea of debiasing through substantive law can 
or does address important choices the legal system must make across a range 
of legal domains. Our discussion follows the division in section 1 above 
between bounded rationality in the form of judgment errors and bounded 
rationality in the form of departures from expected utility theory. Our goal is 
not to reach final conclusions about each of the legal questions we explore, 
                                                 
6 Druckman (2001), however, shows that framing effects are less important 
when one of the options is endorsed by a trusted intermediary. 
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but rather to show the potential value of debiasing through law across a 
number of distinct domains. 
 
In examining debiasing through substantive law, this section focuses 
on forms of bounded rationality that the existing social science literature has 
shown to be responsive to strategies for debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors. This point is important because not all types of bounded rationality 
may respond to such strategies (see, e.g., Fischhoff 1982, pp. 427-31). We 
focus below on cases in which the existing social science literature has 
identified successful strategies for debiasing of boundedly rational actors.  
 
As the discussion in the preceding paragraph suggests, the analysis 
below draws on existing empirical evidence rather than offering new 
evidence of ways of debiasing boundedly rational actors. There is a rich 
literature on prospects for debiasing of individuals after a demonstration of a 
given form of bounded rationality, and the next step from the perspective of 
legal analysis – the step we take in this paper – is to show how substantive 
law does or should play a role in achieving such debiasing. 
 
 
2.1   Debiasing Through Substantive Law in Response to Judgment Errors 
 
 
2.1.1  Debiasing Through Consumer Safety Law 
 
A central impetus for the large body of existing law regulating 
consumer safety is the belief that consumers do not adequately understand the 
potential risks of the products they use. Consumers may not adequately 
understand such risks because they lack factual information, because they 
suffer from bounded rationality – most familiarly because of the phenomenon 
of optimism bias described in section 1.1 above – or both.  
 
  If the problem of limited consumer understanding (assuming there is 
such a problem) merely reflects a lack of information, then the traditional 
corrective is the straightforward provision of additional information (e.g., 
Stiglitz 1986, pp. 90-91). In fact in a wide range of important contexts the 
law requires firms to provide consumers with various types of factual 
information (often in specific, understandable forms), as under the Truth in 




7 However, as the discussion above of optimism bias 
suggested and as various commentators (e.g., Latin 1994, pp. 1243-44) have 
emphasized, optimism bias may lead many consumers to underestimate their 
personal risks even if they receive accurate information about average risks – 
a problem that may arise whenever the key piece of information to be 
disclosed to individuals is a probability estimate (such as the risk of harm 
from a product) rather than a certain outcome.  
 
Many observers have thus concluded that optimism bias (perhaps in 
conjunction with other factors) justifies heightened standards of products 
liability as an alternative to the provision of additional statistical facts about 
the product in question (e.g., Prentice and Roszkowski 1991-1992). But such 
an approach – seeking to insulate legal outcomes from the effects of 
boundedly rational behavior – imposes large costs of its own, as Schwartz 
(1988) and others have suggested. A still more aggressive “insulating” 
approach, available under existing law in the case of some products, is an 
across-the-board ban on the product’s use. A number of federal statutes give 
agencies a choice among disclosure requirements and partial or complete 
bans.
8 In response to evidence of inadequate information, optimism bias, and 
other consumer errors, some regulators might well be tempted to impose a 
ban even if the statute reflects a preference for less restrictive alternatives, 
such as disclosure, where those alternatives are feasible.
9  
 
An alternative to these strategies for insulating legal outcomes from 
the effects of bounded rationality is to use the law to reduce the occurrence of 
boundedly rational behavior in the first instance. At the broadest level, 
strategies for debiasing through consumer safety law provide a sort of middle 
ground between inaction or the earlier prescription (in response to a simple 
lack of factual information) of “more information,” on the one hand, and the 
aggressive “insulating” strategies of heightened products liability standards 
or outright bans, on the other. Strategies for debiasing through consumer 
safety law may be far more successful than the mere provision of statistical 
facts about average risks, and simultaneously far more protective of 
consumer prerogatives than the strategy of an across-the-board ban. Some 
strategies for debiasing through consumer protection law (including in the 
                                                 
7 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601-1667f. 
8 See, for example, Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2051-2085;  
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2692. 





consumer safety area) may be found in existing case law under the Federal 




In the discussion below of debiasing through consumer safety law, we 
will focus on scenarios in which optimism bias is thought to produce an 
overall underestimation by consumers of the risk associated with a given 
product. As Schwartz and Wilde (1983, pp. 1431-46), among others, have 
emphasized, not all settings will be characterized by significant consumer 
risk underestimation as a result of optimism bias. In general, optimism bias is 
context-dependent (Armour and Taylor 2002, pp. 338-41). Moreover, in 
some circumstances, a competing form of bounded rationality could lead 
consumers to overestimate rather than underestimate the risk associated with 
a product. For instance, highly available instances of accident or injury can 
lead to excessive pessimism – a distortion opposite the one produced by 
optimism bias (Schwartz and Wilde 1983, pp. 1437-38). Another possibility 
is that overoptimistic consumers may underestimate base-level risk but 
overestimate the decrease in risk from safety measures – potentially creating 
a positive incentive for firms to undertake such measures (Schwartz 1988, pp. 
376-77). Still another possibility is that likelihoods of very low probability 
events will be overestimated, although the empirical evidence here is mixed, 
with some authors suggesting overestimation of the likelihood of very low 
probability events (e.g., Viscusi and Magat 1987, pp. 90-93) and other 
authors suggesting underestimation of the likelihood of such events (e.g., 
Kunreuther 1982, p. 209). Our focus in this section is on cases in which 
optimism bias is thought to lead to underestimation of the risks associated 






                                                 
10 For discussion of existing approaches under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, see Beales, Craswell and Salop (1981, pp. 495-501, 516-21); Craswell 
(1981); infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
11 In addition, our focus is this specific aspect of consumer understanding 
rather than more general “affect-related” features of consumer understanding. 
For discussion of the distinction between “propositional” knowledge about 
products – such as the probability of harm from a product – and broader 
features such as “affect,” see Craswell (1985, pp. 661-63). For a recent 
comprehensive discussion of the “affect heuristic,” see Slovic et al. (2002). 
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2.1.1.1  Evidence on Debiasing in Response to Optimism Bias 
 
In the social science literature, straightforward strategies for debiasing 
in response to optimism bias include considering risk factors related to 
negative outcomes and suggesting reasons that negative outcomes might 
occur. In a series of studies, however, Weinstein and Klein (2002) find that 
such approaches fail to reduce optimism bias.
12 Their findings suggest that 
successful debiasing strategies in response to optimism bias must take other 
forms. Consider two possibilities, both of which involve harnessing separate 
aspects of bounded rationality in response to optimism bias. 
 
Debiasing through the availability heuristic.  Building on Schwartz 
and Wilde’s (1983, pp. 1437-38) observation about the role of availability, 
one response to the risk that optimistically biased individuals believe “it 
won’t happen to them” is the availability heuristic described above. Recall 
our earlier example of this heuristic: individuals asked how many words in a 
2,000-word section of a novel end in “ing” give much larger estimates than 
individuals asked how many words have “n” as the second-to-last letter 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1983, p. 295). As described in section 1.1, use of the 
availability heuristic often produces a form of judgment error; as with 
optimism bias, availability can lead to systematic mistakes in the assessment 
of probabilities. (Thus “availability bias,” in the form of excessively high 
estimates, and “unavailability bias,” in the form of excessively low estimates, 
involve complementary errors.) But because making an occurrence 
“available” or readily accessible to individuals will increase their estimates of 
the likelihood of the occurrence, availability is a promising strategy for 
debiasing those who suffer from excessive optimism.   
 
  One prominent method for making an occurrence available to 
individuals is exposing them to a concrete instance of the occurrence. Thus, 
for instance, a recent series of studies of smoking behavior finds that smokers 
                                                 
12 Weinstein and Klein note that individualized information about risk factors 
was found in other studies to reduce optimism bias, but we do not pursue this 
finding here because it is difficult to imagine incorporating such 
individualized information into a general legal standard. A similar point 
applies to the one successful debiasing mechanism reported in Weinstein 
(1980) in response to optimism bias; that mechanism – in which individuals 
were exposed to lists made by other individuals of factors improving the 
other individuals’ chances of positive outcomes – again seems hard to 
translate into a recognizable legal standard. 
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are more likely to believe that smoking will harm their health if they are 
aware of specific instances of such harm (Sloan, Taylor and Smith 2003, pp. 
157-79). More generally, people tend to respond to concrete, narrative 
information even when they do not respond, or respond far less, to general 
statistical information (Nisbett et al. 1982, pp. 107-16). Concrete information 
appears to render the incident in question available in a way that can 
successfully counteract optimism bias. 
 
As an illustration of the basic idea of debiasing through the 
availability heuristic in response to optimism bias, consider the finding of 
Neil Weinstein (1980, p. 810) that many people substantially underestimate 
their risk of cancer. Imagine that women asked to estimate their risk of breast 
cancer are told, before giving their estimates, a poignant and detailed story 
about a woman their age with similar family and other circumstances who 
was diagnosed with breast cancer. If so, then the empirical results described 
above suggest that the women’s estimated probabilities will typically be 
higher. (Of course, they may be too much higher or not enough higher – 
points we discuss at some length in our normative analysis in section 3 
below).  
 
Debiasing through framing. A second form of debiasing in response 
to optimism bias involves framing effects of the sort discussed in section 1.2 
above. As we noted, people tend to weigh losses more heavily than gains in 
evaluating potential outcomes. This evidence suggests that framing the 
presentation of information to exploit the extra weight attached to losses may 
counteract bounded rationality in the form of optimism bias. 
 
Consider one well-known illustration of the effects of framing. In a 
study involving breast cancer risk and breast self-examination, material that 
describes the positive effects of self-examination – such as a higher chance of 
discovering a tumor at an earlier stage – produces significantly less 
behavioral change than material that stresses the negative consequences of 
failing to undertake self-examination – such as a decreased chance of 
discovering a tumor when it remains treatable (Meyerowitz and Chaiken 
1987, p. 505). Suppose that women are optimistically biased about the 
prospects that they will suffer from breast cancer and hence underestimate the 
value of engaging in recommended self-examinations. If so, then framing the 
recommendation to self-examine in terms of losses rather than gains should 
increase the probability they attach to benefiting from a self-examination, and 




  Debiasing versus incentives. The examples just discussed illustrate a 
general point about debiasing of boundedly rational actors. Such debiasing, in 
our conception, does not involve providing people with improved incentives 
in the hope of reducing their bounded rationality. In some cases providing 
incentives may in fact diminish people’s bounded rationality. For instance, 
many people are markedly prone to social influence and will ignore even the 
clear evidence of their own senses, and hence provide incorrect answers, if 
they are confronted with the unanimous views of others (Asch 1955); but this 
tendency turns out to be significantly reduced when people stand to gain 
financially from giving correct answers, as long as task difficulty is not too 
high (Baron, Vandello and Brunsman 1996).  
 
  A broad definition of debiasing of boundedly rational actors might 
embrace the use of incentives to reduce bounded rationality (Fischhoff 1982, 
p. 424). A more conservative view, however, is that if an apparent departure 
from unbounded rationality is eliminated with the provision of financial 
incentives, then the apparent departure was not a departure from unbounded 
rationality at all, but instead a mere result of lazy or careless decision making 
by an actor who had no reason to be other than lazy or careless. 
 
  In the analysis above and below, we emphasize this more 
conservative definition and focus on cases in which behavior changes not 
from the provision of financial incentives, but rather from intervening in and 
altering the situation that produces the boundedly rational behavior. Under 
this conception of debiasing of boundedly rational actors, individuals are not 
asked to repeat the very same task with the very same structure, with the sole 
difference that they now have greater reason to take care in making their 
choices; instead the environment is restructured in a way that alters not 
individuals’ motivation but the actual process by which they perceive the 
world around them. 
 
 
2.1.1.2  Legal Implications 
 
We now apply the two forms of debiasing in response to optimism 
bias developed above to the context of consumer safety law.  
 
  Debiasing through the availability heuristic. In the consumer safety 
context, debiasing through the availability heuristic would focus on putting at 
consumers’ cognitive disposal the prospect of negative outcomes from use, or 
at least unsafe use, of a particular product. Specifically, the law could require 
13 
  
firms – on pain of administrative penalties or tort liability – to provide a 
truthful account of consequences that resulted from a particular harm-
producing use of the product, rather than simply providing a generalized 
warning or statement that fails to harness availability. (Recall the example 
from above of an account of a specific woman’s experience suffering from 
breast cancer.)  
 
Familiar in existing consumer safety law are generalized warnings, 
such as the statement on every package of cigarettes sold in the United States 
that smoking may be hazardous to one’s health; but the evidence suggests 
that the approach of requiring the specific account as opposed to the 
generalized statement would help to reduce optimism bias (Nisbett et al. 
1982). Ideally the specific account of harm described here would change 
occasionally to avoid the phenomenon of “wear-out,” in which consumers 




  Our general point here is similar in spirit (although we do not suggest 
a specific requirement of vividness, as emphasized below) to Chris Guthrie’s 
suggestion that legal policy makers should bring “vivid information about 
plaintiff losses in frivolous litigation” to bear in reducing plaintiffs’ 
overestimation of the probability of success in such litigation – an illustration 
of debiasing through procedural rules governing the adjudicative process 
(Guthrie 2000, p. 210). The emphasis on specific narratives also avoids the 
difficulty of coming up with an accurate numerical probability estimate 
(Schwartz and Wilde 1983, pp. 1459-60). Analogies to the approach 
proposed here for the consumer safety context could be imagined as well for 
the important domain of securities disclosure – a domain in which the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has for long struggled with the issue of 
effective communication of risks to prospective investors.
14
                                                 
13 It is possible that, as Douglas Kysar (2003, pp. 1785-1786 and n364) has 
noted, consumer safety strategies for insulating legal outcomes from the 
effects of bounded rationality – as opposed to the strategies discussed here 
for debiasing through law – would give some firms indirect incentives to 
provide the sorts of truthful accounts (emphasizing “people or anecdotes” 
rather than “statistics,” to use Kysar’s phrasing) that we advocate here. Our 
emphasis, however, is on these more direct strategies for debiasing through 
substantive law. 
14 See, for example, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Concept Release 




Of course, for information – of whatever sort – to matter to decision 
makers, it must come to their attention. Thus, in the consumer safety context 
the law might require that the real-life story of accident or injury be printed in 
large type and displayed prominently, so that consumers would be reasonably 
likely to see and read it before using the product. Still, for some of the 
reasons developed most prominently by Howard Latin (1994) – for instance, 
the simple fact of illiteracy among a nontrivial fraction of consumers – no 
warning or statement will be guaranteed to reach each and every product 
user. A further important note concerns the prospects for manufacturers’ 
influence over consumer perceptions; as Edward Glaeser (2004, p. 410) 
writes, “One should expect to see a proliferation of misleading signals and 
other cues when incorrect beliefs are complements to buying sellers’ 
commodities.” In our context, this influence suggests the importance of 
maintaining some legal control over the nature and format of the accounts 
manufacturers are required to provide. It is possible that manufacturers, 
influenced by market pressures, would manage to subvert attempts to achieve 
debiasing through the availability heuristic. At the same time, with such 
debiasing as with any informationally-oriented strategy, there are important 
countervailing benefits to limiting the degree of “overspecification” of 
messages (Beales, Craswell and Salop 1981, pp. 535-36), and the ultimate 




  Debiasing through the availability heuristic–limits. The effort to 
achieve debiasing through the availability heuristic in consumer safety law 
should be modest along two separate dimensions. First, a successful strategy 
                                                                                                                              
Companies,” 60 Fed. Reg. 17,172 (Apr. 4, 1995); see also Securities and 
Exchange Commission Form S–1, Pt. I, Item 3 (requiring disclosure of 
information required by Item 503 of Regulation S–K); Securities and 
Exchange Commission Regulation S–K, §503(c) (requiring disclosure of risk 
factors). 
15 A further important benefit of using availability to counteract optimism 
bias in the consumer safety context is that such an approach would improve 
not only the decision making of consumers suffering from optimism bias but 
also that of consumers suffering from a simple lack of information. A 
conspicuous, prominent account of injury from a product should help to 
correct the estimated probability of harm attached to the product by an 
optimistically biased consumer but is also likely to improve the behavior of 
consumers suffering from a simple lack of information.  
15 
  
would need to target a limited number of discrete products for which the 
problem of consumer optimism bias was most clear and important. (As noted 
above, in some contexts there may not be a problem of consumer optimism 
bias at all.) Consumers would begin to suffer from “information overload” if 
every time they went to buy any product – from a lawnmower to a candy bar 
to a fast food hamburger – they were hit with a real-life story of an individual 
harmed by use or consumption of the product. Their natural response might 
be to tune out all of the accounts provided by firms, even assuming these 




Second, the law would need to avoid overreaching with respect to the 
severity of the featured outcomes; this is especially important in light of the 
fact, noted above, that optimism bias is adaptive in many contexts, and, thus, 
there is certainly little to be gained from transforming consumers into 
thoroughgoing pessimists. Firms should not be required to provide anecdotes 
reflecting highly unusual consequences of using their products, as an 
emphasis on worst-case scenarios could produce excessive responses 
(Sunstein 2002). If requirements of anecdote-based warnings sweep in 
extremely unusual or unlikely scenarios, consumers might overreact – or 
alternatively they might lose faith and fail to attach any weight at all to the 
accounts. Of course there are line-drawing problems here, but the basic point 
is straightforward.  
 
Note in addition that worst-case scenarios are likely to be much more 
easily avoided with our suggestion of a legal requirement that firms provide 
truthful anecdotes about genuine harms than with the alternative strategy – 
frequently used by government – of public information campaigns 
concerning risky consumer products. Such campaigns have often resulted in 
the use of extremely vivid and salient images, to the point of seriously risking 
overreaction or even backlash as a result of citizens’ perceptions of 
government “manipulation.” In the smoking context, for instance, the 
European Union has experimented with requirements that a percentage of 
cigarette packages sold have their fronts covered with vivid pictures of 
                                                 
16 Elsewhere Viscusi (1988, pp.298-301) discusses ways of implementing 
multi-tiered warning systems, where high-risk products contain warnings on 





17 We think the approach suggested here is sounder because it is 
more restrained. Like the European Union, the Canadian Health Ministry has 
required not only clear warnings (“Cigarettes cause strokes,” “Tobacco 
smoke hurts babies,” and “Tobacco use can make you impotent”) but also 
graphic pictures such as highly disfigured gums and lungs with cancerous 
tumors.
18 Likewise, in the United States a well-known anti-drug 
advertisement from the 1980s featured a picture of an egg frying in a pan 
with the voiceover, “This is your brain on drugs” (Dewan 2004). Again, we 
think it is often valuable to avoid such extreme messages. 
 
Overall, our suggestion of requiring, on pain of administrative 
sanctions or tort liability, truthful narratives of harm is a more modest and 
measured response to optimism bias than the approaches just described – 
approaches that harness availability by aggressively exploiting highly salient, 
gripping images and that for this very reason may run an especially high risk 
of manipulation, overshooting, and other problems.  
 
  Debiasing through the availability heuristic–analogies to existing 
practice. The idea of requiring firms to provide truthful accounts of harm has 
analogies in current practice. The American Legacy Foundation, an 
organization founded out of the 1998 settlement agreement between the 
United States tobacco industry and state attorneys general,
19 has launched an 
information campaign employing a close parallel to the strategy outlined here 
of debiasing through the availability heuristic. The Foundation has 
publicized, in leading national magazines and on the internet, parting letters 
to children and other loved ones from mothers dying of smoking-related 
diseases.  For instance, one letter reads, “Dearest Jon, I am so sorry my 
smoking will cheat us out of 20 or 30 more years together. Remember the fun 
we had every year at the lake. I will ALWAYS love and treasure you. 
Linda.”
20 Our suggested approach reflects much the same spirit – although, as 
                                                 
17 See http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/intl-tobacco/2001q1/000426.html 
(visited 6/16/2005). 
18 See  
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hecs-sesc/tobacco/legislation/warnings/warnings.html 
(visited 7/5/2005). 
19 See http://www.adcouncil.org/orgs/american_legacy_foundation/ (visited 
8/18/2005). 




already indicated, firms required to provide truthful accounts would almost 
certainly choose ones less vivid and heart rending than this one. 
 
Our suggested approach also has a kindred spirit in the existing law of 
deceptive advertising under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
21 This Act 
generally prohibits firms from conveying information to consumers in ways 
that risk consumer misperception.
22 Under this law, the Federal Trade 
Commission has restricted advertisements that profile one or two specific 
accounts of success or benefit, based on the concern that consumers will 
overestimate the probability of having a similar experience (Craswell 1985, 
pp. 704-05). In a very real sense, the law of deceptive advertising is thus a 
form of debiasing through substantive law; like our proposed approach here, 
it adopts a middle ground between inaction or naive informational strategies, 
on the one hand, and the “insulating” strategies of heightened liability 
standards or outright bans, on the other. Of course, the law of deceptive 
advertising concerns limits on affirmative statements (advertisements) firms 
choose to undertake, while the proposal here concerns requirements that 
firms affirmatively provide information in particular ways; but in both cases 
the underlying attempt is to use law to reduce the severity of consumer error. 
 
Debiasing through framing. Framing effects also point toward 
potentially effective methods of debiasing through substantive law in the 
consumer safety context. Suppose that firms are affirmatively opting to 
provide information or are providing information in response to a legal 
requirement that does not specifically set forth the form of the information. If 
so, firms’ interest will often be in framing the information in a way that 
minimizes the risks perceived by consumers. (Recall the shrewd actors 
described in section 1.2, who showed an intuitive appreciation of loss 
aversion in objecting to advertisements emphasizing the losses from not 
breastfeeding rather than the gains from breastfeeding.) A strategy of 
debiasing through substantive law in response to consumers’ optimism bias is 
to require that firms identify the potential negative consequences associated 
with their product or a particular use of their product, rather than the positive 
consequences associated with (for instance) an alternative usage.  
 
Such a requirement would, like the law of deceptive advertising 
discussed above, concern statements that firms affirmatively choose to make; 
                                                 
21 15 U.S.C. §§41-58. 




it could also be applied to statements they are legally required to make under 
independent legal provisions. The strategy noted here for debiasing through 
substantive law could make significant progress toward ensuring that 
consumers have a more accurate understanding of the risks associated with 
particular products. It could also reduce the need for either a complete ban on 
some of the products in question or other approaches that insulate legal 




2.1.2  Debiasing Through Corporate Law 
 
A basic question in corporate law concerns the optimal breakdown in 
the composition of corporate boards of directors between so-called “inside” 
and “outside” directors. Inside directors are those who are primarily 
employed by or otherwise closely connected with the corporation; outside 
directors, by contrast, have no such close links to the firm.  
 
Several arguments support the inclusion of at least some outside 
directors on the board (e.g., Brudney 1982, pp. 598-99 and n3). Of particular 
relevance for our purposes is the idea that such directors may help to 
overcome various biased judgments on the part of inside directors 
(Langevoort 2001, p. 803). For instance, inside directors may fall prey to 
optimism bias in predicting corporate outcomes (e.g., Langevoort 2001, p. 
809). To be sure, there are settings in which inside directors may not exhibit 
boundedly rational behavior on balance – for instance because optimism bias 
is counteracted by an excessive level of managerial reluctance to take risks – 
just as we suggested in section 2.1.1 above that in some settings consumers 
might not, on balance, underestimate product risks.  
 
In settings in which inside directors do exhibit optimistically biased 
decision making, one possible response is to insulate outcomes from the 
effects of the optimism bias by removing certain board decisions from the 
inside directors’ hands. By contrast, an approach of debiasing through 
substantive law would, following Langevoort’s argument above,
23 take the 
form of increasing the number of outside directors on the board. Existing law 
                                                 
23 Langevoort himself, however, does not ultimately join those pressing for 
increases in outside directors on corporate boards. 
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has gone in just this direction in the time since Langevoort wrote.
24 Might 
this new approach constitute an effective form of debiasing through 
substantive law?  
 
  
2.1.2.1  Evidence on Debiasing in Response to Optimism Bias (Again) 
 
For outside directors on corporate boards to serve as agents for 
debiasing of optimistically biased inside directors, two things would have to 
be true. First, outside directors would have to be less subject to optimism bias 
than inside directors. Second, the involvement of outside directors would 
have to alter the judgments of inside directors – perhaps even through the 
use, by outside directors, of some of the forms of debiasing discussed in 
section 2.1.1 above. What do we know about each of these two empirical 
propositions? 
 
  The degree of optimism bias exhibited by inside versus outside 
directors has not been rigorously explored, but the corporate law literature 
suggests two reasons for believing that outside directors will show a lesser 
degree of such bias than inside directors (Langevoort 1998, pp. 139-41; 
Langevoort 2001, pp. 803, 809). The first is that, relative to inside directors, 
outside directors’ self-conception and esteem are less closely bundled up with 
the firm’s fortunes. The second reason is that, relative to the selection of 
inside directors, the selection of outside directors is less likely to be heavily 
influenced by whether candidates have highly optimistic views of the firm’s 
prospects. 
 
But will some minimum number of outside directors improve the 
judgments reached by inside directors? A large body of empirical evidence 
shows that erroneous judgments often result when deliberations are 
undertaken by like-minded people; those who agree with one another 
typically end up at a more extreme point in line with their predeliberation 
tendencies.
25 In the context of corporate boards, the prediction is that 
optimistic members will lead one another in the direction of further optimism 
and excessive risk-taking – what has been termed the “risky shift” (Brown 
1985, p. 204). As a result, boards might well end up more optimistic than the 
                                                 
24 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301; infra note 26 
and accompanying text. 




median board member before deliberation began. Therefore, the mandated 
inclusion of outside directors might well serve to check deliberative 
processes that fuel unrealistically optimistic decisions. But the strength of the 
case for an effect of outside directors on inside directors’ – or corporate 
boards’ ultimate – judgments should not be overstated, as corporate law 
scholars have often noted evidence of the general limits on outside directors’ 




2.1.2.2  Legal Implications 
 
  A requirement of the recently-enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that a 
threshold number of outside directors must be named to the corporate boards 
of covered firms. Specifically, the Act requires that such firms use outside 
directors to perform all auditing functions
26; this requirement guarantees a 
minimum number of outside directors on the board. The requirement of 
independent directors – reflected as well in various exchange-listing rules 
(e.g., Bhagat and Black 1999, p. 933) – can be understood, in its legal 
incarnation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as a form of debiasing through 
substantive law. The reason is that the presence of the outside directors 
responds to the risk of optimism bias on the part of boards stacked with 
inside directors. Note that our suggestion is not that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
requirement of outside directors was actually motivated by a desire to engage 
in such debiasing; the corporate governance provisions of the Act, including 
the outside director requirement, appear to have been the product of entirely 
different forces (Romano 2005, pp. 1543-94). 
 
  Corporate law rules governing the structure of the board of directors 
may be a reasonable way to reduce the degree of optimism bias exhibited by 
inside directors. Of course, it is possible that market pressures will impose 
meaningful constraints on optimism bias on the part of inside directors.
27 But 
at the same time, other forces may increase the degree of optimism bias such 
actors exhibit; these include the link between inside directors’ optimistic 
judgments and their self-esteem and the process by which such directors are 
selected (Langevoort 1998, pp. 139-41; Langevoort 2001, p. 809). Of course, 
                                                 
26 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301.  
27 Tor (2002) provides analysis of the effects and limits of market pressures 




wholly apart from the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, many boards do 
contain some or even a majority of outside directors, and this may represent a 
self-conscious effort by firms interested in (among other things) combating 
the problem of optimism bias on the part of inside directors; indeed, some 
firms might wish to go even further and appoint a “chief naysayer” to combat 
such optimism bias (Paredes 2004). A legal requirement such as Sarbanes-
Oxley, however, is likely to facilitate such debiasing for a broader range of 
firms, although at a cost of requiring outside directors on all covered boards 
notwithstanding the likelihood of firm- and industry-specific variation in 
ideal board structure. We return to this last point in section 3.4 below. 
 
 
2.2  Debiasing Through Substantive Law in Response to Departures from 
Expected Utility Theory 
 
Social scientists have paid little attention to debiasing in response to 
departures from expected utility theory (in contrast to debiasing in response 
to judgment errors). The reason may be that such departures are not 
unambiguous “errors,” and thus it is controversial to say (for example) that 
the endowment effect, or loss aversion, is a kind of mistake that requires 
correction. Perhaps for the same reason, strategies for insulating outcomes 
from the effects of bounded rationality – familiar in the contexts discussed in 
section 2.1 above – are less prominent where departures from expected utility 
theory are in play.  
 
Our emphasis in this section is on the endowment effect, which (as 
discussed in section 1.2 above) says that individuals’ willingness to accept – 
the amount at which they would sell an entitlement – differs from their 
willingness to pay – the amount they would pay to purchase the same 
entitlement. As suggested by our comment just above, the endowment effect 
generally cannot be said to be an “error” in the sense of the judgment errors 
discussed in section 1.1, where individuals are making objective mistakes in 
estimating probabilities; instead the endowment effect may be a reflection of 
potentially valid reasons for the difference between willingness to accept and 
willingness to pay. In some contexts, however, a decision maker may 
determine that either willingness to accept or willingness to pay is the 
“correct” measure of value. Such settings are our focus in this section; we 
consider the role of debiasing through substantive law in moving toward the 
chosen measure of value, which itself is taken as a given rather than 
independently justified in our analysis. We refer briefly to the question of a 





2.2.1  Debiasing Through Property Law 
 
  With the ever-growing importance of intellectual property, the legal 
protection awarded to creators of such property is a central question of 
property law. For any property law entitlement, an important aspect of its 
legal protection is whether the entitlement is protected by a “property rule” or 
a “liability rule” (Calabresi and Melamed 1972). Under a property rule, 
entitlement holders are not required to part with their entitlements unless they 
voluntarily agree (typically in a bargained-for exchange) to do so. Under a 
liability rule, by contrast, entitlement holders may be forced to give up their 
entitlements as long as they are paid a legally-specified amount in damages.  
 
The American and European intellectual property systems differ 
significantly in their reliance on property rules versus liability rules. Where, 
for instance, an entitlement holder wishes to make use of related intellectual 
property owned by another entity, in the United States the entitlement holder 
generally faces a property rule regime, whereas in many European countries 
the entitlement holder faces a liability rule regime (Merges 1996, p. 1316). In 
the analysis just below, we assume that a decision maker has determined that 
lowering willingness to accept to the level of willingness to pay for an 
intellectual property entitlement (in cases in which these two measures differ) 
is desirable, and we then explore how the choice between property and 
liability rules might play a role in achieving this effect. Our basic conclusion 
is that the European systems, in the domains in which they adopt liability rule 
protection, may achieve a form of debiasing through substantive law given 
the assumed desirability of lowering willingness to accept to the level of 
willingness to pay. 
 
 
2.2.1.1  Evidence on Lowering Willingness to Accept to the Level of  
 Willingness to Pay Through the Use of Liability Rules 
 
A preliminary empirical study by Jeffrey Rachlinski and Forest 
Jourden (1998) points to a potential relationship between the divergence 
between willingness to accept and willingness to pay and the way in which 
the entitlement being valued is protected from violation. Rachlinski and 
Jourden’s study finds a marked reduction in the disparity between willingness 
to accept and willingness to pay when liability rules rather than property rules 
protect the entitlement in question. In the standard endowment effect pattern, 
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willingness to accept is well above willingness to pay when the entitlement is 
protected by a property rule. But Rachlinski and Jourden find that when it is 
protected by a liability rule, willingness to accept falls to the level of 
willingness to pay, consistent with the hypothesis offered in earlier work by 
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley (1995, pp. 1101-02).  
 
Rachlinski and Jourden explain their results by suggesting that “[a] 
right that is protected by a damages remedy might convey less of a sense of 
ownership than does a right that is protected by an injunctive remedy” 
(Rachlinski and Jourden 1998, p. 1560). Such incomplete ownership may 
prevent a perfection of the emotional attachment that is harbinger of the 
endowment effect. Subjective value, in short, may well be lower when a right 
is protected by a liability rule. Rachlinski and Jourden’s empirical findings 
suggest that in domains in which lowering willingness to accept to the level 
of willingness to pay is desirable, liability rules may be preferable to property 
rules – although of course a complete analysis of the choice between property 
and liability rules involves many additional considerations (Kaplow and 
Shavell 1996).  
 
 
2.2.1.2  Legal Implications 
 
  Under Rachlinski and Jourden’s findings, the European system of 
intellectual property protection, in the domains in which it adopts a liability-
rule approach, achieves a form of debiasing through substantive law (again 
given our background assumption that bringing willingness to accept down to 
the level of willingness to pay in the context in question is desirable). The 
European approach in these domains eliminates the endowment effect by 
moving individuals’ willingness to accept into line with their willingness to 
pay. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the device of choosing liability rules 
over property rules in protecting intellectual property entitlements would 
generally have the effect of reducing willingness to accept to the level of 
willingness to pay for these entitlements. Holders of intellectual property 
entitlements might be unaware of how, exactly, their entitlements are 
protected; if intellectual property law uses liability rules rather than property 
rules, perhaps many entitlement holders will not be aware of it. Note also that 
in Rachlinski and Jourden’s study, the entitlements at issue involved 
environmental amenities, not intellectual property. In the distinctive context 
of environmental amenities, the occurrence of the endowment effect under a 
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property rule may have been “motivated by subjects’ belief that it is improper 
to sell an environmental resource that one can protect,” while this belief was 
not triggered under a liability rule “because the law permitted the destruction 
of the resource for a price” (Korobkin 2003, p. 1285). Absent the societal 
commitment to environmental amenities, for which people often demand a 
great deal and may even refuse to sell at any price at all, it remains possible 
that the choice between property and liability rules would not have the same 
impact on willingness to accept versus willingness to pay. Further empirical 
work could help to shed light on this question.
28  
 
It should also be emphasized that one can question whether the 
willingness to pay measure is in fact the correct value in the context of 
intellectual property entitlements; as noted above, we have not sought to 
provide an independent defense of that position here. On one view, there is 
no correct value; when a person owns some entitlement X, the person simply 
values it more than when the person must purchase it. Whether it is right to 
say there is no correct value depends on the reason for the endowment effect. 
Suppose, as is sometimes hypothesized, that the high value placed on things 
that one owns is a product of a failure to appreciate opportunity costs – an 
undervaluation of the costs of refusing to sell such items. If so, the 
willingness to pay measure is to be preferred because it does not reflect this 
distortion in judgment. 
 
 
2.2.2  Debiasing Through Agency Law 
 
  In the context of merchants, a strong endowment effect will make 
merchants reluctant to sell their goods. If the excess of willingness to accept 
over willingness to pay in this context is undesirable, then might debiasing 
through substantive law be possible in this domain? We describe below how 







                                                 
28 Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001, pp.253-55) argues, but without presenting any 
direct empirical evidence, that property rules may be preferable to liability 
rules for reducing the endowment effect in some contexts. 
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2.2.2.1  Evidence on Lowering Willingness to Accept to the Level of  
 Willingness to Pay Through the Use of the Agency 
 Relationship 
 
An empirical paper by Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric 
Talley (2002) demonstrates the prospects for debiasing of boundedly rational 
actors exhibiting the endowment effect (again assuming it is desirable to 
eliminate the excess of willingness to accept over willingness to pay). Arlen, 
Spitzer and Talley find that actors exhibit the standard excess of willingness 
to accept over willingness to pay when they are acting in their ordinary 
individual capacities – but not when they are acting in the role of corporate 
managers in a business agency context. Individuals who are instructed that 
they are acting as agents for the corporation that employs them “manifest[] 
virtually no endowment effect whatsoever” (Arlen, Spitzer and Talley 2002, 
p. 5). 
 
  What explains these findings? Two likely explanations involve the 
business context and the manager’s agency relationship with the firm.
29 
Someone working in business – even if acting not as the agent of a 
corporation but as a sole proprietor – will probably exhibit less of an 
endowment effect than someone acting in an ordinary individual capacity. 
One might think, for instance, that transactions conducted by a shoe store – 
whether or not the store is run by a manager – would not exhibit a large 
endowment effect. Such a store would be unlikely to stay in business long if a 
strong endowment effect led it – whether acting through a manager or a 
proprietor – to price shoes at an amount well above people’s willingness to 
pay.   
 
It seems likely, however, that the agency relationship further dampens 
the tendency toward exhibiting an excess of willingness to accept over 
willingness to pay. This is so because the endowment effect is often linked to 
a desire by entitlement holders to avoid regretting a bad decision to engage in 
a transaction (sale of the entitlement).
30 By contrast, agents will tend to be 
less likely than ordinary individuals to experience regret because their 
personal stake in the outcomes that occur is lower (Korobkin 2003, p. 1255). 
                                                 
29 Korobkin (2003, p. 1279) emphasizes that a third explanation may be the 
certainty of the entitlement value in Arlen, Spitzer and Talley’s agency 
relationship. 
30 For recent discussions, see Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003, pp.1224-25); Korobkin (2003, pp.1254-55). 
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Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the agency relationship itself helps to 
account for the finding of an absence of an excess of willingness to accept 
over willingness to pay in a business agency relationship – although of course 
a definitive empirical study separately testing the two explanations could help 
put the conclusion on firmer ground. 
 
 
2.2.2.2  Legal Implications 
 
  An implication of Arlen, Spitzer and Talley’s empirical findings is 
that existing rules of agency law, in structuring the relationship between 
corporations and their managers, may achieve a form of debiasing through 
substantive law for managerial actors (assuming, again, that it is desirable to 
eliminate the excess of willingness to accept over willingness to pay). Acting 
in the context of the relationship specified by the default rules of agency law, 
individuals may not display the endowment effect that has proven robust in 
other settings. Note that our focus here, as in our discussion above of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is on the (perhaps unanticipated) effects of the law 
rather than the particular motives of legislators or other actors in enacting it. 
 
  In theory, the obligations associated with a business agency 
relationship could be specified by privately negotiated arrangements rather 
than by the default rules of agency law. Such arrangements could ensure that 
much of business is done by agents acting on behalf of firms under a 
specified set of duties. Indeed, this may be what Arlen, Spitzer and Talley 
(2002, p. 33) have in mind when they suggest that “the nexus of relationships 
often identified with ‘the firm’ may operate (at least in part) as a debiasing 
mechanism, thereby representing an underappreciated consequence of 
organizing trade within firms.” However, as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel (1982, p. 702) have suggested, arrangements negotiated within firms 
may impose extremely high costs, particularly given “the difficulty that 
contracting parties have in anticipating when and how their interests may 
diverge”; therefore our point here, following Easterbrook and Fischel, is to 
emphasize the valuable role of law in achieving the debiasing described 
above. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the complexity and nuance of 
the requirements to be imposed within the firm point to the important value 
of legal rules. Our argument is simply that the basic rules of agency law 
provide an illustration of how existing rules may sometimes accomplish 







3.   Normative Issues in Debiasing Through Law 
 
In many settings, debiasing through law, whether achieved through 
substantive law or through procedural rules governing the adjudicative 
process, provides a more direct and effective response to problems of 
bounded rationality than the more typical approach of insulating legal 
outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior that itself is taken 
as a given. Below we develop and defend this central claim about the 
normative appeal of debiasing through law in its substantive and procedural 
law incarnations. We also address possible normative objections to debiasing 
through law; some of these apply to “insulating” strategies as well, while 
others are distinctive to debiasing through law. Because much of our analysis 
below will address comparisons with “insulating” strategies, it is important to 
emphasize that our conception of debiasing through law does not embrace 
notions of legally-related “debiasing” that encompass various forms of 






                                                 
31 Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort (2004) use the term “debiasing” to refer 
in a broad way to the potential response of the “fraud by hindsight” rule of 
securities law to the problem of hindsight bias. Some of the effects they 
include in their “debiasing” category – for instance, “insulat[ing] judgments 
from the hindsight bias” (p. 781) and requiring courts to use “ex ante 
standards, such as generally accepted accounting principles” (p. 792) – fall 
into the “insulating” category rather than the “debiasing through law” 
category within our framework. Likewise, Langevoort (1998, p. 1510) refers 
to proposals for addressing hindsight bias in Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 
(1998a) as “mechanisms for debiasing,” but within our framework these 
proposals are “insulating” strategies because they take hindsight bias as a 
given and then seek to reduce or eliminate its effects on legal outcomes. Our 
use of the term “debiasing” to refer specifically to situations in which 
bounded rationality diminishes, as opposed simply to having its effects on 
outcomes blunted by a legal rule, seems more consistent with the accepted 
meaning of “debiasing” in the social science literature, as in that literature 
debiasing refers to reducing people’s manifestation of boundedly rational 
behavior in the first instance. 
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3.1  Normative Analysis – In General 
 
In the areas discussed thus far, and in many imaginable contexts, 
social planners might choose among three categories of approaches to 
decisions stemming from bounded rationality:  “insulating” strategies, 
strategies for debiasing through law, and refusing to respond at all. And of 
course a range of options might present themselves within the first two 
categories. In our view the appropriate choice depends on the consequences 
and hence on close engagement with particulars.  
 
It is easy to imagine situations in which bounded rationality presents a 
modest problem, so that any cure is worse than the disease. If some 
boundedly rational consumers are purchasing excessively safe cars, because 
the availability heuristic has led them to overestimate risks, the argument for 
a governmental response does not seem particularly strong, at least if it 
assumed that the social costs of the relevant purchases are low. A 
governmental response is also likely to be unwarranted where people are able 
to correct their own errors (e.g., Rachlinski 2003, pp. 1206-19; Rasmussen 
1998, pp. 1697-98). And in some circumstances, “insulating” strategies will 
be the best alternative. Suppose, for example, that a particular bias leads most 
people to unambiguous and extremely serious error, and also that efforts at 
debiasing through law are likely to fail. If so, it might well be best simply to 
foreclose certain choices. But in other circumstances, the argument for 
debiasing through law will be convincing – as, for example, when a refusal to 
respond to bounded rationality will ensure large welfare losses, and when 
debiasing through law will be less costly than any alternative.  
 
We suspect that some of the examples given in section 2 fall in this 
category, for several reasons. First, as emphasized especially in the 
discussion of consumer safety law in section 2.1.1 above, a special virtue of 
debiasing through law is that, relative to many “insulating” strategies, it 
maximizes the preservation of people’s opportunity to make choices. Instead 
of blocking decisions, it is preferable to attempt to improve decision making 
(Rachlinski 2003, p. 1224). It is a familiar point that choice-preserving 
remedies of this general nature are valuable because they acknowledge both 
that individuals have diverse preferences and that planners may err (e.g., 
Beales, Craswell and Salop 1981, pp. 513-14; Viscusi and Magat 1987, pp. 
60-61). If some sort of governmental response to consumer optimism bias is 




A second virtue of debiasing through law is that it reduces the effects 
of legal intervention on those not suffering from bounded rationality in the 
first place. In responding to problems of bounded rationality, it is preferable, 
when possible, to develop legal approaches that avoid imposing significant 
costs on those who do not exhibit boundedly rational behavior (Camerer et al. 
2003, p. 1212). As observed by Gregory Mitchell (2002, pp. 132-35), 
strategies for debiasing of boundedly rational actors will often make it 
possible for government to improve outcomes for individuals who exhibit 
bounded rationality while leaving largely or entirely unrestricted the choices 
of those who would not otherwise err – a point we elaborate as well as 
qualify below.. 
 
It bears emphasis, however, that our goal in this paper is not to offer 
final recommendations about, or systematic comparisons for, any particular 
problem, including those discussed in section 2. Instead our goal is to 
illustrate the potential uses and generality of the approach of debiasing 
through law, especially debiasing through substantive law. Additional 
examples of debiasing through substantive law are explored in Jolls 
(forthcoming) and Sunstein (forthcoming). 
 
 
3.2   Offsetting Effects 
 
We noted just above that sometimes neither debiasing through law 
nor strategies for insulating legal outcomes from the effects of bounded 
rationality may be an appropriate course of action. An important example 
here is the case in which a given form of boundedly rational behavior is 
offset by another aspect of bounded rationality that tends in the opposite 
direction. Simply put, some departures from unbounded rationality can 
counteract others; we gave several examples in section 2 above. In such cases 
efforts either to engage in debiasing through law in response to a given form 
of bounded rationality, or to insulate legal outcomes from the effects of this 
form of bounded rationality, might actually make things worse rather than 
better.  
 
Whether a given aspect of bounded rationality is in fact likely to be in 
an offsetting relationship with some other feature of bounded rationality will 
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of course depend on the particular context, as noted in section 2 above.
32 
Obviously, if an offsetting relationship with another feature of bounded 
rationality exists, a legal response – whether  debiasing through law or an 
“insulating” strategy – may well be unwarranted. 
 
 
3.3  Correcting Factual Errors  
 
Section 2 above distinguished between debiasing through law in 
response to judgment errors (section 2.1) and debiasing through law in 
response to departures from expected utility theory (section 2.2). In the latter 
context, the government intervention obviously cannot be said to operate 
simply by correcting clear factual errors; and thus in section 2.2 we assumed 
rather than argued that, in certain contexts, reducing willingness to accept to 
the level of willingness to pay was a suitable target of debiasing through law. 
But when debiasing through law is a response to a clear factual error, the 
normative impetus for the government intervention is far more 
straightforward. 
 
Debiasing through law in response to a clear factual error – for 
instance, a consumer’s underestimation of the probability that an accident 
will occur – is indistinguishable (in terms of the normative impetus for the 
intervention) from a vast array of existing government initiatives. In 
countless domains, the government either discloses information on its own or 
requires disclosure by those providing goods or services in response to 
erroneous factual perceptions people would otherwise hold (e.g., Stiglitz 
1986, pp. 90-91). When people have erroneous views about factual matters, 
there is broad agreement that government may legitimately concern itself 
with correcting their errors. It seems hard to think of a plausible objection to 
this ground for government intervention (although of course, as noted 
already, intervention may ultimately prove unwarranted if its benefits are not 
justified by its costs).  
 
Note the distinction between our focus here on debiasing through law 
and possible strategies of what might be called “biasing through law.” In 
some cases, social planners may wish that people’s factual estimates diverged 
from the truth; for example, planners may want  people to overestimate the 
                                                 
32 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998a, pp.1524-25), for instance, discuss the 
partially offsetting relationship between hindsight bias and optimism bias in 
the tort law context. 
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probability of being caught if they choose to speed or evade taxes. But 
strategies directed toward such objectives, even if socially desirable, would 
not be forms of debiasing through law within our definition, as they would 
not be responding to any identified form of bounded rationality. 
 
While the government’s ends in our analysis are thus uncomplicated 
(either because the ends involve correction of clear factual errors or because, 
as in section 2.2, we have simply assumed that eliminating the endowment 
effect is a suitable target of government action
33), the means employed in 
debiasing through law require further discussion. In the example of debiasing 
through consumer safety law, for instance, the government action in question 
involves harnessing separate departures from unbounded rationality to correct 
individuals’ errors. Mechanisms of this type raise important and distinctive 
issues, to which we now turn. 
 
 
3.4 Heterogeneous  Actors 
 
As recent literature has appropriately emphasized, not all individuals 
are likely to be boundedly rational, at least not to the same degree (e.g., 
Mitchell 2002, pp. 83-119, 139-67). As noted above, an important virtue of 
debiasing through law is that, in contrast to “insulating” strategies, the 
approach of debiasing through law can often avoid significant effects on 
individuals who do not exhibit bounded rationality. But in some 
circumstances, a strategy of debiasing through law could introduce new 
distortions through its effect on those who did not previously exhibit bounded 
rationality.  
 
Consider, for instance, the strategic employment of the availability 
heuristic in response to optimism bias, discussed in section 2.1.1 above. In 
this case, the legal intervention conceivably could distort the behavior of 
individuals who did not suffer from optimism bias in the first place. For those 
who previously had an accurate understanding of the situation, such strategies 
for debiasing through law could produce a kind of unrealistic pessimism. In 
such cases, it is no longer possible to say that, even if the legal intervention 
does not provide much help, it is unlikely to cause much harm. (Note the 
contrast with traditional strategies of providing information to those who 
previously lacked it; such strategies should not significantly affect those who 
                                                 
33 For normative discussion of government intervention in the context of 
(among other things) the endowment effect, see Sunstein and Thaler (2003). 
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already possessed the information (e.g., Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1230-37), 
though perhaps such strategies might prompt responsive behavior – for 
instance by affected firms through their pricing strategies – that would in turn 
affect those who did not initially suffer from information failures.)  
 
A similar problem arises with respect to debiasing through corporate 
law in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. If, among the set of 
heterogeneous corporate boards, some do not exhibit optimistically biased 
judgments on the part of inside directors, then the legally-mandated presence 
of outsiders on the board could introduce distortions (for instance, because 
outside directors are less well-informed than inside directors) for boards 
whose behavior was previously undistorted. So too, the strategies described 
in section 2.2 for debiasing through law in response to the endowment effect 
conceivably could alter measures of value for those who did not initially 
exhibit an excess of willingness to accept over willingness to pay. 
 
In some cases, actors who do not suffer from a particular form of 
bounded rationality, such as optimism bias, will also be free of other forms of 
bounded rationality, such as reliance on the availability heuristic. If those 
who are immune from optimism bias also tend to be immune from 
availability bias, then the strategies described above for debiasing through the 
availability heuristic should not affect those who did not previously suffer 
from optimism bias. In such cases, strategies for debiasing through law – like 
traditional informational strategies (Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1230-37) – 
should not affect those who did not exhibit bounded rationality prior to the 
legal intervention.       
 
When the absence of one form of bounded rationality correlates in 
this way with the absence of others, strategies for debiasing through law fit 
well with the broader emerging theme, noted above, of adopting approaches 
that respond to bounded rationality but avoid imposing significant costs on 
those who do not exhibit this type of behavior. A leading illustration of such 
a strategy is “cooling periods” before important decisions are made (e.g., 
Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1238-47).  
 
In all of our examples of debiasing through substantive law in section 
2 above, the government intervention is unlikely to be entirely cost-free for 
those who did not previously show bounded rationality. But even the simple 
provision of information by government – often a wholly uncontroversial 
strategy – will impose some costs on those who did not err prior to the 
intervention, simply because of the burden of processing the information. If 
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the intervention produces important benefits for those who are prone to 
bounded rationality, then the intervention may be desirable even if it imposes 
modest costs on others. Here, as in other contexts, the only option is to weigh 
the effects of the different possible strategies. Of course efforts to debias 
people through law should be undertaken, whenever possible, in ways that do 




3.5   Overshooting  
 
The means employed by government in debiasing through law can 
create the risk of overshooting. If, for instance, truthful narratives are used in 
the context of consumer safety law, individuals who previously showed 
optimism bias might be led to exaggerate the risks of consumer products. The 
effort to debias through law would then be producing biases and errors of its 
own.  
 
But this concern is not in any way specific to debiasing through law 
as distinguished from conventional “insulating” strategies; overshooting is 
always a possible danger. Undoubtedly experimentation would be required to 
calibrate the degree to which availability or another form of bounded 
rationality would need to be brought to bear in engaging in debiasing through 
law; so too, experimentation is  necessary under an “insulating” approach to 
determine the appropriate level or scope of the legal response. The problem 
of the scope of a legal corrective, and the risk of overshooting, are general, 
not specific to the means used in debiasing through law – although naturally 
if this problem is severe enough then a governmental response of any sort 
may be unwarranted.  
 
 
3.6   Autonomy 
 
A more fundamental concern with debiasing through law involves 
individual autonomy. When government is engaged in (what it considers to 
be) “debiasing,” there is a risk that it will manipulate its citizens to serve its 
own objectives. If officials “debias,” they might be violating the autonomy of 
ordinary people. In some cases of debiasing through law in response to 
judgment errors, for instance, government may be correcting bounded 
rationality by exploiting it, in a way that might give rise to fears of 
manipulation. In the applications discussed in section 2, this occurs perhaps 
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most obviously with respect to harnessing availability and framing in 
response to consumers’ optimism bias. The risk of manipulation in the guise 
of debiasing through law – a risk that may not be raised by “insulating” 
strategies – appears especially disturbing in light of the fact that regulators 
are often self-serving or vulnerable to the interests of powerful private 
groups.  
 
It is clear that if bounded rationality is pervasive, then an informed 
government is likely to have little trouble in manipulating people in its 
preferred directions. Such a government might engage in manipulation on its 
own behalf, or in support of its preferred interests. Government should of 
course respect its citizen. As emphasized, for instance, by the publicity 
condition in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971, p. 133),  regulators 
should generally refrain from engaging in acts that could not be defended in 
public to those who are subject to those acts. If a public defense could not be 
made, the acts are an insult to the autonomy of citizens. (Deontologists will 
emphasize the insult to autonomy as such; consequentialists will of course 
care about violations of the publicity condition only insofar as such violations 
have bad consequences.)  
 
Is debiasing through law a violation of the publicity condition? Much 
of the time, the answer is negative. If, for example, government harnesses 
availability and framing in response to consumers’ optimism bias, there is no 
reason to think government would have to conceal or make ambiguous its 
efforts to correct people’s errors. Citizens need not be disturbed to learn what 
government is doing, and there is no reason for regulators to keep their 
efforts secret. To be sure, it may be troubling for some people to learn that 
government has “framed” a message to produce the desired result, but there is 
no violation of the publicity condition.
34
 
As we have noted, government efforts to correct individuals’ factual 
mistakes are widespread and largely uncontroversial. The worry about 
government “manipulation,” if there is a worry, arises even with the widely 
accepted approach under which the government corrects simple information 
failures (where people are mistaken because they lack information entirely, 
rather than because they process information in a biased way) among 
citizens. As framing effects as well as other departures from unbounded 
rationality reveal, there is usually no neutral way to present information. 
Whenever the government is presenting even accurate information, it is 
                                                 
34 See Luban (1996) for further discussion of the publicity condition. 
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making choices about presentation – choices that will inevitably affect how 
citizens perceive the reality around them. Thus, it is far too simple, and 
behaviorally naive, to draw a sharp line between acceptable “provision of 
information” and unacceptable “mind control.” Unless the concern with 
government manipulation is strong enough to suggest that the government 
should never provide information to its citizens (an implausible suggestion), 
there must be at least some willingness to tolerate the prospect of government 
influence over citizens’ perceptions of reality and the attendant risk of 
government manipulation.  
 
Suppose, for example, that smokers were found to discount the risks 
that accompany smoking, in part because of optimism bias. If so, it is hardly 
obvious that government would violate their autonomy by giving a more 
accurate sense of those risks, even if the best way of giving that accurate 
sense were through concrete accounts of suffering. And it is also far from 
clear in such a case that the government could not publicly defend its strategy 
to citizens as required by the publicity condition; recall in this connection the 
American Legacy Foundation letters campaign described in section 2.1.1 
above.   
 
This is not to say, of course, that no form of debiasing through law 
could be objectionable on autonomy grounds. Some forms might resemble 
systems of propaganda in clear violation of the publicity condition. If so, 
there is not only an insult to autonomy; there is also a real risk that the one-
sidedness and aggressiveness of the government’s effort will be exposed. If 
this happens, public trust will unquestionably be reduced. And if trust is 
reduced, government strategies are much less likely to succeed. For many 
people, these instrumental concerns will seem aggravated by strong moral 
ones. At least when minors are not involved, the law should treat citizens 
with respect, and extreme marketing strategies (going well beyond what we 
have suggested in discussing strategies for debiasing through law) violate that 
principle. In addition, debiasing through law in response to the endowment 
effect, as discussed in section 2.2 above, may prove ineffective if the 
debiasing effort is disclosed; if people know that the government has adopted 
a particular legal rule in order to reduce willingness to accept to the level of 
willingness to pay, then it is possible that willingness to accept will no longer 
drop under that rule. 
 
With respect to autonomy, no general conclusion is likely to make 
sense. The nature and force of the objections discussed above will obviously 
depend on the setting and the particular strategy involved. However, these 
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objections seem weakest when government is responding to a form of 
bounded rationality that unquestionably qualifies as an “error” and is using 
methods that do not distort the facts.  
 
 
3.7  “Behavioral Bureaucrats”   
 
Nothing said thus far denies the important fact that legal policymakers 
and administrators, including those who seek to engage in debiasing through 
law or other corrective strategies, will often suffer from bounded rationality 
themselves. (Indeed, existing literature extends the traditional focus on 
debiasing of boundedly rational juries or other adjudicative decision makers 
by considering debiasing of boundedly rational government bureaucrats (e.g., 
Rachlinski and Farina 2002, pp. 582-90, 596-600, 603-06; Seidenfeld 2002, 
pp. 508-26).) No less than ordinary people, bureaucrats use heuristics and are 
subject to predictable biases; they are also susceptible to the influence of 
powerful private groups with stakes in the outcome. Indeed, the very 
accountability of bureaucrats suggests that they will be affected by the 
bounded rationality of the citizenry. It is certainly plausible to worry that 
efforts at debiasing by behaviorally sophisticated regulators may operate in 
practice to reward well-organized private groups, or perhaps to promote the 
interests of regulators themselves. 
 
In this light we do not make the naive and implausible suggestion that 
in the real world, strategies for debiasing through law will always be well-
motivated and well-designed. (Nor will strategies designed to insulate legal 
outcomes from the effects of bounded rationality.) Our claim is only that if 
people exhibit bounded rationality, debiasing through law may often be a 







  The central goal of this paper has been to draw attention to the 
distinctiveness and the potential value of debiasing through law, especially 
debiasing through substantive law. The social science literature has devoted a 
great deal of effort to the study of debiasing of boundedly rational actors, but 
                                                 
35 For a general discussion of “behavioral bureaucrats,” see Jolls, Sunstein 
and Thaler (1998a, pp. 1543-44). 
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with little effort to see how law and legal institutions might accomplish that 
goal. Those interested in bounded rationality and law have argued mostly that 
legal outcomes should be insulated from the effects of boundedly rational 
behavior, and in some cases that debiasing of boundedly rational actors 
should be pursued through changes in procedural rules governing the 
adjudicative process. It is tempting to contend that if most people make 
welfare-reducing choices because of bounded rationality, their choices should 
be blocked. In our view, debiasing through law – especially debiasing 
through substantive law – is a distinctive and sometimes far preferable 
alternative to the strategy of insulating legal outcomes from the effects of 
bounded rationality. Such debiasing often promises to be both more 
successful and less invasive than more conventional alternatives.  
  
  Nothing in our analysis is inconsistent with the claim that in some 
contexts, unfettered markets are the best response to bounded rationality. 
Such markets might reduce the effects of bounded rationality by raising the 
stakes, as suggested in section 2.1.1 above; it is also possible that the costs of 
boundedly rational behavior are, in some contexts, lower than the costs of 
any effort to counteract it. In some contexts, private actors, alert to the risk of 
bounded rationality, will take corrective action on their own. We also do not 
disagree with the now-familiar suggestion that in the face of bounded 
rationality, aggressive regulation – some form of “insulating” strategy – 
might sometimes be justified.
36 Instead our aim has been to chart the 
possibility of a middle course, one that asks legal institutions not to ignore 
people, but instead to reduce their bounded rationality.  
 
In some contexts, debiasing through law is likely to be effective, cost-
justified, and minimally intrusive. We believe that some areas of the law 
reveal an appreciation of these points and hence an implicit behavioral 
rationality, using legal strategies as a mechanism for debiasing of boundedly 
rational actors. Our principal goal has been to understand those strategies in 
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Appendix:  Strategies for Debiasing Through Law 
 
  This appendix briefly summarizes some leading empirical research 
on debiasing of boundedly rational actors and its implications for debiasing 
through both substantive law and procedural rules governing the adjudicative 
process. 
 





















    




















































































































                                                 
37 Self-serving bias overlaps to some degree with optimism bias, discussed at 
length in the text. An important distinction between the two categories is that 
self-serving bias generally relates to negotiation contexts – such as the 
litigation and settlement context – and, because of that fact, a major aspect of 
people’s biased judgments within the domain of self-serving bias concerns 
the fairness of alternative outcomes. See Babcock et al. (1995, pp. 1337-38); 
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998a, pp. 1501-04). Self-serving conceptions of 
fairness are not usually categorized as a form of optimism bias; by contrast, 
bias in estimated probabilities of discrete outcomes – such as the result at trial 
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governing 
protection of 
intellectual 
property 
entitlements 
(section 
2.2.1); 
agency law 
(section 
2.2.2). 
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